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Introduction
On 1 March 2005, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces launched an
offensive in the northeast of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to
suppress a rebellion.^ At 08:00, commanders deployed twelve armoured per
sonnel carriers. Ground forces cordoned off the area and asked for air support.
At 11:00, the target was located and engaged. Mi-25 attack helicopters
swooped in, firing sixteen rockets in eight passes. The militia camp was
successfully ‘neutrahzed’ and UN troops were withdrawn from the area by
16:00. An estimated fifty rebels were killed. Tt may look like war’, explained
Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye, Force Commander of the mission, ‘but it is
peacekeeping.’^ ‘We were impartial.’^
The assault, part of the UN’s Operation Djugu III, was no aberration. Since
1999, blue helmets in places such as Sierra Leone, Haiti, Ivory Coast, and
Mali have conducted military offensives to ‘keep’ and ‘make’ peace. Once
limited in scope and based firmly on the consent of all parties, peacekeeping
operations are now regularly authorized under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, charged with penalizing spoilers of the peace and protecting
civilians from peril. Anything less amounts to what the Report of the
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) condemned as ‘complicity
with evil’.^ Peacekeepers are now expected to search for, and then side with,
the victims.
Despite this more aggressive posture, UN officials such as Lt. Gen. Gaye as
well as academics continue to affirm the vital importance of impartiahty—a
norm traditionally regarded as the ‘oxygen’^ and ‘lifeblood’® of peacekeeping—
while stating that it no longer means what it once did. They characterize
the new impartiality as ‘active’ impartiality,^ ‘unrestrained’ impartiality,®
even ‘imperial’ impartiality®—implying that peacekeepers are, or should be,
robust and assertive in carrying out their increasingly lofty and ambitious
mandates.
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IMPARTIAL PEACEKEEPING AND ASSERTIVE
LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM
This book is the first scholarly attempt to analyse this transformation and its
implications. It argues that the change in the understanding and practices of
impartiality is significant. Because impartiality refers not only to the position
of peacekeepers as an unbiased and informed third party but also to the values
and norms the UN itself seeks to project, this change, which is manifest in
discourse and institutionalized in doctrine and rules of engagement (RoE),
signifies a radical transformation in the very nature and substance of
peacekeeping, and in the UN’s role as guarantor of international peace
and security. Claims to impartial authority are no longer based exclusively
on terms to which all parties consent. Instead, they are premised on a more
ambitious and expansive set of human-rights-related norms, around which
consensus is presumed but not always secured. While traditional peace
keeping mandates treated parties with moral equivalence and eschewed
notions of blame and punishment, instigators of violence are often now
seen as criminals—their crime a form of moral collapse to be judged and
righted by peacekeepers, rather than as a symptom of a political conflict to
be mediated.
What is more, this change is not limited to peacekeeping. It is an integral
part of the turn towards what I refer to as a more assertive liberal internation
alism, one that is transforming existing international institutions and prac
tices, particularly the UN. The realization, promotion, and protection of
human rights is at the core of this broader shift and has translated into
forms of international engagement that are less consensual and more com
pulsory and coercive, justified by upholding human rights and constellating a
new class of international crimes.^®
Here, too, claims to impartial authority figure prominently, but they have
taken on new meaning. For example, through the principle of universal
jurisdiction, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is imprecedented in its
claim to impartially investigate and try alleged perpetrators of international
crimes independently of whether their states have given consent to the organ
ization by ratifying the Rome Statute. “ In the field of humanitarian assistance,
many of today’s aid workers no longer impartially provide emergency relief to
individuals based exclusively on need. Decisions about who should receive
assistance are now often influenced by whether they help or hinder the
realization of rights. While claiming to be impartial, humanitarian actors
frequently advocate for human-rights protections and actively seek to reform
pohtical and social structures that impinge on those rights. Similarly, the UN’s
Human Rights Up Front policy, developed in 2013, puts the imperative to
protect people from serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law at the core of the organization’s strategy and operational
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activities, and obliges staff to speak out on an ‘impartial basis about abuses
and looming crises.
The legitimacy of this more assertive liberal internationalism, and associ
ated claims by peacekeepers, judges, and aid workers that their more coercive
and intrusive actions are impartial, rests largely on what is extolled as a
newfound unity of purpose. What is the base for such a claim? Academics
and practitioners alike contend that the ‘internationalization of human rights’
over several decades has allowed for an acceptable transformation in the
foundation of certain norms that now have authority not because they are
based on the consent of individual states, but rather because they are seen to
reflect a collective international consensus—what scholar Ruti Teitel describes
as the ‘new law of humanity’.*^ At the core of this transformation is the idea
that human rights and the protection of those rights, particularly for those
most vulnerable in armed conflict, are no longer tied to a particular political or
partisan agenda. ‘Protecting civihans transcends politics, as one diplomat
recently proclaimed in the Security Council.'"*
This notion has become a powerful piety, described by some as the ‘new
ideology’, even a ‘secular religion’.'^ The unassaUably worthy conviction that
human rights and peacekeeping in the service of those rights are above
politics, and that above all, individual civilians should be protected, is potent.
It allows for simple and easily comprehensible accounts of right and wrong, in
what are often contexts of extreme human suffering. It differentiates victim
from perpetrator, assigns innocence and guilt, and it furnishes apparently
straightforward answers to questions about what must be done to bring about
good, to stop the suffering. In other words, it provides something to believe in.
All of which makes it very difficult indeed to argue with. Contestation, fi-om
this perspective, would appear to be a thing of the past.
This book examines this shift towards assertive liberal internationalism in
the context of UN peacekeeping. This focus is important because, despite the
significance of this change and the long lineage of impartiality in peacekeep
ing, the norm has been the subject of surprisingly little sustained analysis.'
Whereas consent of the host state and non-use of force—the two other norms
traditionally associated with peacekeeping—have been the focus of several
comprehensive academic studies,'^ unpartiality has received little more than
passing references to its vital unportance'* and its application in specific
historical cases.'^ Given that the dominant meaning of impartiality has rad
ically changed, this omission is a glaring oversight, not least because of its
implications/or the other two norms.
Rather, in an apparent case of ‘taking sides’, scholars of peacekeeping have
done more actively to advocate for the new more assertive conception of
impartiality and applaud its institutionalization in the new millennium than
they have critically to interrogate the norm and its implications from political
and operational perspectives.^" In their reflections on the peacekeeping
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failures of the 1990s, many academics excoriated the UN and its ‘institutional
ideology of impartiality’ as entirely inappropriate for the post-Cold War
operational environment of catastrophic mass violence?^ They contended
that ‘impartiality had to be reconceived’, called for clarification in both the
conceptual and operational domains, and advanced their own interpretations
of the norm.^^ Others imposed a distinction where none had previously
existed; they redefined Cold War peacekeeping, ex post facto, as ‘neutral’ to
denote its passive character whereas it was hoped that post-Cold War activity
would, in a more dynamic sense, be ‘impartial’.^^ These texts do not engage in
rigorous conceptud analysis or with what one author describes as the ‘broader
political-strategic issues surrounding new impartiality’.^^ Lacking this wider
view, our understanding of the politics and practices of contemporary peace
keeping, as well as the normative framework that underpins and is used to
justify the authority of peacekeepers and the UN, is incomplete and partial.
Meanwhile, peacekeeping has descended into a state of renewed crisis. In
many mission contexts, which have experienced repeated crises in recent
years, peace and stability have become a mirage. In places like Darfur, South
Sudan, Burundi, and Congo where the UN’s political space has been restricted,
mandate implementation has been thwarted by intransigent host govern
ments, freedom of movement has been curtailed, officials have been made
persona non grata and missions have, at various junctures, been threatened
with expulsion. What is more, an increase in attacks on and kidnappings of
UN personnel has prompted troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to with
draw contingents from missions that are already notoriously under-resourced
and plagued by technical difficulties.

THE POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING
It is in this context that a closer and more critical examination of the dominant
conception of impartiality as a norm of UN peacekeeping becomes essential.
This book starts from the premise that claims to impartiahty must be con
sidered as only that—claims. Rather than accept that consensus exists over the
meaning and appropriateness of the new more assertive conception of impar
tiality, and that the decisions and actions of peacekeepers are impartial, I take
these as assertions that require empirical investigation. History is rife with
instances of closeted sectarianism and abuses of authority under the guise of
impartiality. Without social validation there is a danger that impartialism
becomes, as John Rawls cautioned, ‘just another sectarian doctrine’, except
that, whereas others are up front about their sectarianism, impartiahsts con
ceal their predilections.^^ Indeed, it is precisely because, as Thomas Franck put

Introduction

5

it, impartiality’s ‘yoke is so eminently wearable’, that a closer look at the norm
in contemporary peacekeeping is vital.^®
Two central and closely connected questions provide the overarching focus
for this inquiry. First, how is impartiality understood as a norm of UN
peacekeeping and, second, what are the effects of this understanding? To
answer these questions, I conceptualize impartiality as a ‘composite’ norm,
one that is not free-standing but is in fact an aggregate of other principles—
each of which can change and is open to contestation, singly or in combin
ation. Drawing on political and legal theory, I elucidate the core components
of impartiality and provide much needed conceptual clarity.
The composite norm is then used to conduct a multi-level analysis. I trace
the evolution of impartiality in peacekeeping and examine the macro-level
politics surrounding institutionalization of the new, more assertive conception
of the norm at the UN, as well as the micro-level politics surrounding its
implementation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, site of the largest
and costliest peacekeeping mission in UN history (1999-2015).^^ I identify the
various sites and sources of contestation over assertive impartiaUty at both
levels and explicate their linkages. Multi-level analysis is crucial because
impartiality is a peripatetic norm, relevant from the hallowed halls of UN
headquarters in New York to the remote villages where blue helmets deploy.
To understand how, amidst contestation, certain conceptions of impartiality
have become dominant both in policy and practice, I analyse different insti
tutional decision-making pathways and their power dynamics. In doing so,
this book illuminates how certain actors wield greater influence than others in
determining the policies and practices of UN peacekeeping, and the meaning
of impartiahty itself.
The Congo case is particularly salient in examining the effects of imparti
ality on peacekeeping practice as well as broader institutional dynamics. The

Mission de VOrganisation des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du
Congo (known by its French acronym, MONUC) was first deployed in late
1999, three years before the formal end of Congo’s epic war and just as the new
conception of impartiality began to take hold at the UN. It was a testament to
the prevailing thinking in the Security Council. During dehberations on the
creation of the mission, lessons learned from previous peacekeeping failures
were recounted, and the need for robust peacekeeping affirmed by various
member states.^* Indeed, MONUC became the standard-bearer for a new era
of blue-helmet intervention and represented, as South African ambassador
Dumisani Kumalo opined, a ‘litmus test’ for the Council’s commitment to
peacekeeping in Africa.^^
MONUC’s decade-long deployment saw the institutionalization of the
more assertive conception of impartiality manifest in Council resolutions
that steadily increased the reputed robustness of the mission. Its Chapter VII
mandate expanded to encompass the entire country, naming and shaming of
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spoilers became a recurrent feature of resolutions, and protection of civilians
was designated MONUC’s highest priority. In 2010, the mission was renamed
the Mission de VOrganisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en
Republique Democratique du Congo (MONUSCO), a signal that the UN was
willing to use force more proactively, and in 2013, the Council deployed the
Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a specialized unit within MONUSCO,
authorized to take offensive military action to ‘neutralize’ and ‘disarm’ rebel
groups.^*^ Throughout this period, Congo became a laboratory for more
assertive approaches to peacekeeping, and operational mechanisms and guid
ance developed by MONUC/MONUSCO in turn fed back into policymaking
at UN headquarters, leading to more general innovations in doctrine.^* In
addition, Congo became a focus country for the ICC and, more broadly, the
locus of numerous humanitarian reform initiatives associated with assertive
liberal internationalism.
And yet, the analysis of impartiality at both macro- and micro-level in
Congo reveals that despite a veneer of consensus, ‘impartiality’ is in fact a
highly contested norm. As the collection of principles it refers to has changed
and expanded to encompass human rights, contestation has increased, with
deep disagreement among key UN member states and local actors in Congo as
to what keeping peace impartially means and, consequently, over the purposes
of contemporary peacekeeping and the UN’s broader approach to conflict
resolution. This is not to say that human rights in peacekeeping are irrelevant.
Few would disagree that they matter deeply, arguably more so now than ever
before. But, as this book demonstrates, human rights cannot be divorced from
power and partisan interests, past injustices, and present inequalities. Nor can
they be considered separately from the privileges still accorded to states in
international relations and particularly those at the UN, given its state-centric
constitution.
The contestation over assertive impartiality reveals this plurality of con
tending perspectives at multiple levels. The objections raised during institu
tionalization within the UN are varied and diverse as Chapter 3 demonstrates.
They reflect fears, frequently emanating from the experiences of some states as
colonial subjects, that more coercive forms of peacekeeping chip away at
sovereignty and self-determination and may be used to realize more nefarious
intentions. They come in the form of charges of hypocrisy, and criticisms of
unequal burden-sharing in peacekeeping. They reveal concerns about the
viabihty of and the moral hazards engendered by contemporary practices—
hard lessons learned from time on the ground. And they have very real
implications for the willingness of traditional troop-contributing countries
to sustain these operations as well as for the UN’s acceptance on the ground.
These forms of contestation have also been manifest during implementa
tion, a process that, as I show in Chapter 4, generates its own forms of
disagreement related to the historical, social, and political dynamics in
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Congo. Among the many sites and sources of contestation, from tensions
between troop-contributing countries to bitter divisions within the Security
Council over policy towards the Congo and the wider region, I show how the
dichotomies attendant in assertive impartiality often break down in practice.
In Congo, there were often no clear answers to the questions of who is
perpetrator and who victim, who protector and who in need of protection.
And thus, attempts to pass judgment and take action by assigning such roles
have, at numerous junctures, divided those involved, from the warring parties
themselves to the peacekeeping mission, and more broadly, the international
community.
Beyond the semantics, this disagreement has led to inconsistencies in
peacekeeping practice, which further amplify perceptions of partiality and,
together with the varying expectations and incentives created by the norm,
have frequently resulted in perverse and unintended consequences that run
contrary to the norm’s original intent and undermine the UN’s legitimacy. In
Congo, civilians who were told that UN forces would protect them were at
times emboldened to take even greater risks. Instead of fleeing to possible
safety, they remained in place, or travelled in insecure conditions to UN bases.
When protection was forthcoming, such risks were worthwhile. When it was
not, the consequences were sometimes fatal. Similarly, armed groups and
factions of the national army manipulated the mission and its mandate in
order to realize strategic and political aims. The discourse of civihan protec
tion was, for example, co-opted and instrumentalized by certain militia in an
effort to change perceptions of their own legitimacy and to de-legitimate other
actors, including the mission itself. This had negative consequences for peace
keepers and the UN, and crucially impeded their ability to act and be accepted
as a political arbiter, as a broker of peace.
As a whole, the book shows how the transformation in impartiality has
deeply politicized peacekeeping and, in some cases such as Congo, effectively
converted UN forces into one warring party among many. I argue that the
implications of this change are significant, not only for peacekeeping but for
the UN more broadly. As several scholars have demonstrated, the legitimacy
of the organization—and by extension the likelihood of its securing the
resources and access so critical to its operations—derives not just from its
practical effectiveness, but from whether it is seen to reflect and promote
shared values.This is of consequence, given that the institutional and
broader geopolitical landscape have profoundly shifted. The rise of nonWestem states and changes in the global balance of power mean that
contestation around underlying values, as described in this book, is likely
to persist and even to grow. As the Conclusion argues, this raises pressing
questions about the UN’s future role and its ability to act as the legitimate
guarantor of international peace and security if it is perceived as partial, as
having taken sides.
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THEORETICAL APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTIONS

This book is designed to speak to scholars and practitioners of peacekeeping
and the UN, to others interested in Congo and, more broadly, to those
concerned with the challenges associated with assertive liberal international
ism. Yet it is not solely a work of policy analysis and prescription. It contrib
utes to debates within the inter-disciplinary field of peacekeeping studies,
which has undergone remarkable growth over the last decade.^^ The literature
on peacekeeping has long been criticized for being apolitical and overly
focused on the macro-level, skirting the importance of context and treating
peacekeeping operations as technical policy tools. This trend, however, is
being reversed by a body of work that does explore the political dimensions
of peacekeeping operations.^"* Overlapping this research is a growing field of
scholarship that has ‘gone micro’.^^ Drawing on the burgeoning political
science literature on the micro-foundations of conflict, as well as insights
from anthropology and sociology, this diverse research agenda has drawn
much needed attention to the local dimensions of peacekeeping and peace
building, including, the everyday practices of interveners, their interactions
with local actors, and the consequences, intended and otherwise, of inter
national engagement. These investigations affirm the importance of context,
the contingency of peacekeeping practices, and offer a valuable counterpoint to
macro-level analyses that have dominated the field and approached peacekeep
ing as a predominantly international phenomenon.
My analysis of impartiality’s implementation and effects in Congo comple
ments this scholarship. This book, however, departs from this body of work in
stressing the importance of multi-level analysis. Whereas existing texts tend to
look either at the global or the local dimensions of peace operations, I examine
both and explore the relationship between them. As the analysis shows, this is
important because the global politics of peacekeeping are not and cannot be
separated from the local dimensions of peacekeeping. For example, as
Chapter 3 details, the states which contribute the preponderance of peace
keepers to Congo were among those most critical of assertive impartiality
during institutionalization, most notably India and Pakistan. This had a
profound effect on peacekeeping in Congo, as these actors resisted the new
conception of the norm and advanced their own interpretations, which in turn
heightened contestation at the field level and led to inconsistencies in practice.
The multi-level analysis of impartiality also contributes to scholarly debates
about the role of norms in international relations—what they are, the effects
they have, and how and where they should be studied. As Chapter 1 explains,
I understand impartiality as a norm in the social constructivist sense of the
word, as a 'prescription[] for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of
obligation, a sense that [it] ought to be followed’.^ For constructivist scholars,
the sense of ‘oughtness’ inherent in norms such as impartiality stems from
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their existence as ‘social facts’.^^ They are beliefs or ideas that have no
independent material or physical reality, and exist only because they are
held intersubjectively—shared, to a certain degree, by actors in a group or
community. This collective aspect is what gives norms their force.
Until recently, constructivist theorizing has been largely dominated by
linear accounts of ideational change involving dichotomous outcomes, binary
oppositions whereby actors either accept and institutionalize/internalize a
norm, or resist and reject it. In what has been described as a series of
‘waves’, scholars considered norms as developed and transported by norm
entrepreneurs and social networks to be institutionalized internationally
through various forms of sociaUzation (first wave).^® They emphasized the
role of socio-legal structures to explain variance in institutionalization at the
regional and domestic level (second wave).^^ And they introduced the notion
of localization: the adaptive processes of‘reinterpretation’ and ‘reconstitution’
through which international norms become congruent with pre-existing local
normative orders during institutionalization (third wave).^° In other words,
how international norms ‘stick’ if they have, or are made to have, local
resonance. The importance accorded to institutionalization by these scholars
is premised on their behef that it produces consensus, as actors clarify the
meaning of a norm, what constitutes ‘violation’, and what procedures wiU be
used to coordinate ‘disapproval’ and impose ‘sanctions’ for violations.^*
A norm’s formal adoption, in other words, is considered the bellwether of
behavioural change.
However, as others have argued, this focus on the structuring power of
norms downplays their inherent dynamism and complexity, the role of power
in changing fteir content and scope, and in determining when, how, and why
certain norms matter more than others, and to what effect.^^ What follows a
norm’s institutionalization—actual practice—is for the most part left un
attended in orthodox considerations of norms.^® This assumes an improbably
straight line between ideas and outcomes, and suggests a somewhat simplified
view of human agency in which action is reduced to ‘something that ap
proaches stimulus-response behaviour’.^ Moreover, it ignores the very real
possibility of contestation either between two norms that do not fit together,
or of conflicting interpretations of the same norm following its formal accept
ance. It is precisely because norms like impartiality are not objective truths but
rather intersubjectively held beliefs that they can continue to be contested and
their meaning change even as they are formally adopted, shaped by practice,
and by the broader social context in which they are situated.
To account for this dynamism and the inherent contestability of norms,
I conceive of impartiality as a composite. The composite norm is a heuristic
tool that captures the changing meaning of impartiality and provides analyt
ical purchase for the study of contestation at both the macro- and micro-level.
Rather than simply rejecting or accepting impartiahty, it reveals how actors
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may resist particular elements of a norm and/or advance their own interpret
ations of these elements, shaped by both ideational and material consider
ations, and how, during both institutionalization and implementation, certain
interpretations or group interpretations may be privileged.^® These nuances
matter precisely because they shape behaviour and social expectations of
behaviour. As Martin Hollis reminds us: ‘norms are no less effective for
being fluid and no less real for being negotiable’.^ Indeed, it is critical to the
argument of this book that the contestability of norms like impartiality does
not invalidate, or even necessarily weaken them. Rather, it brings them, vitally,
into the real and present-day world.
By widening the analytical lens to examine implementation in the Congo
case, this book also engages with an emerging area of research on normative
practice. These scholars critique constructivism’s longstanding neglect of what
happens after a norm like impartiality is institutionalized. Understanding the
actual effects of international norms, they argue, requires the study of their
implementation, or what one scholar describes as their ‘meaning-in-use’."*^
This body of work fully embraces the social essence of norms and highlights
the practices, structures, and agents associated with norm interpretation and
implementation, that, as the work rightly demonstrates, often result in norm
contingency and contestation.*®
My approach complements this research, but, similar to the peacekeeping
literature, it also demonstrates the importance of accounting for both institu
tionalization and implementation as distinct, but often related, processes. To
illuminate the mechanisms that incite contestation during implementation,
scholars in this emerging area analytically bracket the disagreement over the
meaning and/or appropriateness of norms that may have occurred during
institutionahzation.*^ In doing so, they overlook the effects that institutional
ization dynamics may have on the very practices they seek to understand.
This omission is problematic, inasmuch as it assumes that the practice of
international norms can be understood without consideration of how they are
debated, drafted, and institutionalized—processes that are frequently fraught
with contestation and unresolved differences. As Chapter 2 describes, the
UN’s formal adoption of a new conception of impartiality did not represent
the moment of clarity suggested by many constructivist models. What is more,
ambiguity at the macro-level over the norm’s relationship to sovereignty, the
result of unresolved differences, became an issue in Congo when state officials
were found to be complicit in widespread hmnan-rights abuses and the
mission, in turn, was internally divided on how to respond in a manner
consistent with impartiality. The implications of this for the present study
are clear: if the meaning of impartiality was contested during its institution
alization and if, as a result, it is vague and ambiguous, its implementation
cannot be studied in isolation from the broader politics associated with its
development and formal adoption.

Introduction

11

METHODOLOGY
The theoretical approach 1 adopt to analyse impartiality has methodological
implications. Given my emphasis on the contextual and contingent nature of
norms, I pursue an interpretivist approach, which, as Mark Bevir explains,
seeks to understand actions and events by taking into account ‘the intentions,
concepts, and ideas constitutive of them’.®® In doing so, I employ a number of
different methods.
Since this book proceeds from the argument that there has been a shift in
the dominant understanding of impartiality as a norm of UN peacekeeping, a
first, key task is to demonstrate that change. To do so, in Chapter 2 I construct
a historical narrative of impartiahty using the composite norm.®^ Through
textual analysis of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, I examine
the norm’s origins at the UN, trace the evolution of its components over six
decades, and explicate the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the dominant
understanding of impartiality that was institutionalized in the new millen
nium.®^ This provides the basis for my subsequent analysis of macro-level
politics surrounding institutionalization, as well as micro-level politics sur
rounding implementation in the Congo case.
To illuminate political dynamics at both levels, the research is situated in
what some have labelled the ethnographic turn in International Relations
(IR).®® Like others in this emerging area of scholarship, I use ethnographic
methods, including extensive fieldwork, participant observation, and semistructured interviews at both the global and local level—an approach referred
to as ‘multi-sited ethnography’. One of the advantages of this methodology is
that it affords access to key institutional actors and local figures, as well as
opportunities for sustained observation, both of which are necessary to study
contestation directly. In the present study, this approach provided insight into
critical decision-making processes surrounding peacekeeping in Congo and
the effects of those processes on those responsible for and affected by the
practices of UN peacekeeping. It also enabled an in-depth analysis of impar
tiality at the macro-level, and by extension an account of the relationship
between headquarters and the mission.
Fieldwork was carried out in several locations. Research on macro-level
dynamics was done primarily in New York, with supplementary interviews
in Washington, Ottawa, London, Paris, Brussels, Geneva, and Nairobi.
Research for the case study and micro-level politics of peacekeeping was
conducted during four periods of fieldwork in Congo between 2008-15. In
Congo, I worked in a diversity of locales, from remote rural bases to field
offices in the country’s eastern region, to the national headquarters of the
mission in Kinshasa, the capital.®^ This allowed me to discern critical
differences in how officials in these areas understood their role and inter
preted their mandates.
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Multi-sited research produced multiple types of data and sources to
illuminate contestation and the effects of the norm. A significant portion
of data derives from the more than 300 semi-structured interviews
I conducted with individuals involved in every aspect of peacekeeping: senior
UN officials, diplomats, member state representatives, civil and military field
officers, armed group members, civil society actors, and conflict-affected
populations. In selecting my interviewees, I aimed to gain exposure to the
broadest range of perspectives. I actively sought out individuals who con
tested the dominant conception of the norm but who were largely excluded
from decision-making during the processes of institutionalization and
implementation. In New York, for example, I met with member states
affiliated with the non-aligned movement (NAM), including representatives
of the largest troop- and police-contributing countries. Findings from these
interviews were supplemented by numerous discussions with political ana
lysts and scholars who closely follow developments at the UN. The majority
of these interviews were conducted under the condition of anonymity given
political sensitivities surrounding the research and potential professional,
reputational, and security ramifications.®^
Participant observation, which entails more intensive interaction between
the observer and observed, complements the interview data. Observation
conducted primarily for the case research was facilitated through attendance
at daily internal UN meetings,®® field visits with UN staff, and by accompany
ing peacekeeper patrol sweeps in rural areas.®^ These encounters shed light on
the nature of the UN’s operations in Congo and assisted in understanding
broader, ongoing political and security developments. This access also pro
vided a particularly effective way of exploring the difference between formal
policies and mandates, and actual practice. Lastly, I consulted a comprehen
sive set of primary and secondary sources. These materials were used to cross
check data obtained through interviews and participant observation, to ensure
accuracy and to mitigate potential bias or selectivity of information.®®
Two final points of clarification on methods are necessary. The first con
cerns the extent of my claims about the effects of impartiality. In evaluating
the broader repercussions of the norm, I am not suggesting that impartiality
‘causes’ particular action or outcomes in a constant or deterministic way, as is
construed by positivist methodologies. Like other constructivists, I am inter
ested in how norms may guide, inspire, rationalize, or justify behaviour; in
other words, how understandings of impartiality and contestation over the
norm enable and constrain particular actions or possible outcomes.®^ More
over, my account of implementation notably draws particular attention to
both the intended and unintended effects of norms. As discussed above,
constructivists have tended to assume that, once adopted, a norm ‘does what
it says on the tin’, i.e., induces actors either to undertake or avoid the
behaviour it prescribes or enjoins. In contrast, my analysis shows how
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norms can also have unforeseen consequences as individuals respond stra
tegically to the constraints and opportunities afforded by the international
normative structure and by the expectations it engenders. In doing so, the
book moves beyond the usual constructivist emphasis on how ‘good’ norms
make the world better, showing that ostensibly well-intentioned norms can
have harmful, even disastrous, consequences.®®
Lastly, in order to delve deeply into the material, the analysis was focused on
a single-case study. While some social scientists highlight the limitations of the
single-case study approach, namely, the lack of generalizability across cases
and potential selection bias, these concerns apply to scholars seeking to
develop falsifiable claims, and thus do not apply to the present study. Instead,
the rigorous single-case research approach chosen here allowed me to go
narrow and deep, and is necessary to explicate in sufficient detail the process
of impartiality’s change, contestation, and effects across various levels of
analysis. The Congo case, which stretched over fifteen years, serves the
heuristic purpose of elucidating contextual contingencies during both institu
tionalization and implementation, and the implications of assertive imparti
ality in UN peacekeeping.®^ The length of the conflict also enabled me to look
at the change over time within that context. In contrast to theory testing, the
approach adopted is thus more akin to theory generation; it provides a strong
empirical base, which allows for additional case research and conceptual
refinements.®^ To include a second or third case would have required a
sacrifice of depth for the sake of breadth. Given the paucity of conceptual
analysis on impartiality as well as the intrinsic importance of the Congo case,
objectives of generalizability are less applicable in this context. That said, as
I discuss in the Conclusion, the analysis presented in this book opens the door
to future research into how impartiality is being contested in other peacekeep
ing cases and, more broadly, into the practices of those institutions associated
with assertive liberal internationalism.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
Chapter 1 outlines the book’s conceptual framework. Both existing research
on peacekeeping and popular discourse on UN operations are rife with
conceptual confosion, exemplified by the frequent conflation of impartiality
with neutrality. This confusion is not limited to scholarship on peacekeeping.
Impartiality figures as a central concept in moral, political, and legal theory.®^
Yet, despite its ubiquity in the literature, impartiality is lamented by some
critics as ‘almost universally misdescribed’,®^ ‘haphazardly analyzed’,®® and as
having ‘stumbled its way into a series of holes, imponderables, and seeming
contradictions.’®®
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Chapter 1 thus seeks in part to provide conceptual clarity regarding the
norm of impartiality. It also situates this study within the constructivist
approach. I introduce and develop the concept of a composite norm and
elucidate the components of impartiality. This grounds the subsequent ana
lysis of how understandings of impartiality in UN peacekeeping have changed
and the ways in which the norm itself has been contested during the processes
of institutionalization at the macro-level and implementation in the Congo
case.
Using the composite norm, Chapter 2 traces the evolution of impartiality
within the UN, explicates the reasons for and significance of the reconceptua
lization of impartiality in the new millennium, and situates this change in the
broader shift towards a more assertive liberal internationalism. As peace
keepers and other international actors became more heavily engaged in
intra-state conflict during the 1990s, in contexts where consent for their
operations was tenuous, they confronted difficult questions about the sources
of their own authority and how to adjudicate disputes between competing
local claimants of authority. Assertive impartiality was an attempt to re-ground
the authority of these actors in what was presented as a newfound unity
of purpose: the culmination of the internationalization of human rights
over several decades, and the supposed disassociation of rights from a particu
lar political or partial agenda. Crucially, however, and contrary to what many
constructivist theories would hold, impartiahty’s institutionalization has not
resulted in conceptual clarity. The chapter concludes by considering the
various ways in which the new dominant understanding of impartiality is in
fact ambiguous and imprecise, rife with contradictions.
Through an analysis of political dynamics within the UN at the macroorganizational level. Chapters calls into question the purported consensus
over the dominant conception of impartiality and the purposes of contem
porary peacekeeping. It demonstrates how impartiality’s ambiguity is partly a
reflection of contestation, and elucidates the procedural, substantive, and
consequential objections of various actors. The chapter explains how, despite
fierce contestation, the Security Council has continued to authorize robust
mandates in accordance with the new conception of impartiality. It argues that
the surmounting of this disjuncture is explained by the Council’s overarching
ability to determine peacekeeping policy. But, crucially, the power of Council
members is not unfettered; they too face constraints due to the very nature of
assertive impartiality and to their prior rhetorical affirmation of the norm.
These dynamics matter, precisely because they have an impact on peacekeep
ing practice.
From here, my analysis turns to the process of implementation and the
micro-level politics associated with peacekeeping in Congo. Chapter 4 begins
with a brief historical overview of the conflict and the five phases of the UN
mission (1999-2015). I examine each phase, and identify critical junctures
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where spoilers obstructed the peace or political process, and/or civilians faced
imminent threats or were harmed: situations that, according to assertive
impartiality, warrant the use of force. The chapter reveals how judgments as
to who was perpetrator and who was victim, as well as to who was the
protector and who the party in need of protection, were subjective, fluid and
deeply contested, reflecting dynamics at both the global and local level. As a
result of this contestation, implementation of the norm was inconsistent, with
a host of unintended consequences.
Chapter 5 examines the effects of assertive impartiality on four specific sets
of actors at the field level: civilians, armed groups, the state, and the UN
mission itself. It shows how the robust role prescribed for peacekeepers
raised expectations and created incentives for local actors in the Congo,
engendering behaviour that would not have occurred otherwise. These
effects damaged the mission and deepened local perceptions that the UN
was partial. Despite these consequences, the Security Council’s response to
policy failure in the Congo, time and time again, was to scale up the
mission’s mandated ‘robustness’, which in turn only further tarnished its
credibility and capacity to act as a broker of peace. The chapter argues that
in the absence of consensus over a real strategy to resolve conflict in the
Congo, without a willingness by member states to commit the necessary
political capital and resources, assertive impartiality offered merely the
illusion of constructive and active engagement. Ambitious mandates that
aimed to save lives projected an image of consensus. They covered up deep
political divisions at both the global and local level, while making scant
progress to foster peace in Congo.
The Conclusion lays out the book’s implications for theory and policy. It
summarizes the findings, discusses their relevance for other contemporary
peace operations and offers a way forward. It argues that analysis of the
inherent and perhaps irreconcilable tensions and moral quandaries associ
ated with the new conception of impartiality is critical if we are to move
beyond the usual litany of ‘lessons learned’ studies as well as the technical
solutions to peacekeeping dilemmas so frequently tabled by practitioners
and academics.
Understanding contemporary peacekeeping practice as well as other liberal
internationalist advances requires an acute sensitivity to context, and an
appreciation of how politics—international, institutional, and local—shapes
practice. More fundamentally, the way in which even the most laudable of
international norms may produce grievous unintended consequences requires
both practitioners and academics to be more reflective about the norms they
study, defend, and even espouse. Seen from such a multiplicity of perspectives,
the loud circling of the UN’s helicopter gunships during Operation Djugu III
represents a stage of evolution in international relations that this book argues
is anything but impartial.
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particular events or following specific operations. This research was coupled with
close analysis of all Security Council resolutions authorizing the deployment of
over 1,000 forces to determine the changing substance and practices associated
with impartiality and called for in mission mandates. Secondary sources on
peacekeeping, the UN, humanitarianism, international criminal justice, military
intervention, and international history were critical in providing a broader context
for impartiality’s evolution at the macro-level.
For IR scholarship drawing on ethnographic methods, see Michael Barnett,
Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2002); Stephen Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2007); Autesserre (2010, 2014).
During my fieldwork, I was based in Goma, the capital of North Kivu province.
The Kivus are the epicentre of Congo’s ongoing conflict and for much of the last
decade have been the priority area for the UN mission and its operations. Research
was conducted throughout North Kivu in five of the province’s six territories
(Masisi, Rutshuru, Beni, Nyiragongo, and Lubero). I also made separate trips to
Bukavu, capital of South Kivu, and Kinshasa to gain a broad spectrum of perspec
tives and ensure that my findings were representative of mission dynamics more
generally.
Throughout the book I fully reference the data obtained through on-record
interviews. In characterizing anonymous interviewees, I list only their official
status, month, year, and location of the interview. In certain cases, location is
omitted to ensure confidentiality and safety of participants.
From January to April 2010,1 attended daily briefings at ‘Forward HQ’ in Goma.
These meetings were roughly an hour in duration and covered security and
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